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“FRAMING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” 
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw* † 
With the passage of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”), 
Michigan joins California and Washington to constitute the new post-
affirmative action frontier. For proponents such as Ward Connerly, affirma-
tive action is on the edge of extinction. Connerly plans to carry his 
campaign against what he calls “racial preferences” to eight states in 2008, 
scoring a decisive Super-Tuesday repudiation of a social policy that he por-
trays as the contemporary face of racial discrimination. 
On the other side of the issue, proponents of affirmative action are 
struggling to regroup, fearful that the confluence of lukewarm support 
among Democratic allies, messy presidential politics and a menacing Su-
preme Court may spell the end of affirmative action as we know it. Of 
course predictions of the untimely departure of affirmative action have been 
wrong before. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s surprising decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger caught runaway circuit judges and trigger happy pundits celebrat-
ing the demise of affirmative action a little too soon.  
Yet the terms of the Court’s decision sparing affirmative action from 
constitutional death inexorably led to the MCRI. Staging an end-run around 
Grutter, MCRI’s proponents sought to capitalize on the fact that while the 
Court permitted affirmative action to survive as an institutional prerogative 
of the law school, it did not recognize affirmative action as a matter of con-
stitutional right, a guardian against the unwarranted exclusion of 
institutionally marginalized groups. Grutter did reaffirm and expand the 
diversity logic of Justice Powell’s “lonely opinion” in University of Califor-
nia Regents v. Bakke, previously maligned and discredited by anti-
affirmative action forces. Yet the Court failed to breathe new life into a more 
fundamental predicate for affirmative action articulated in the footnotes of 
Powell’s compromise judgment. There Justice Powell suggested that if there 
was evidence that the traditional admissions criteria constituted an unfair 
barrier for qualified minority students then affirmative action policies that 
offset those criteria would not represent a form of preferential treatment. 
Unsurprisingly, neither Michigan nor any other university seeking to defend 
affirmative action has opted to re-present these measures as something other 
than racial preferences. It is this failure to challenge the fundamental base-
lines of merit which ground allegations of preferential treatment that leaves 
affirmative action defenseless, a rudderless vessel set adrift upon a sea of 
distortion and racial resentment.  
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The politics of racial resentment, readily expressed and fully mobilized 
in the campaign to enact the MCRI, should give pause to anyone who car-
ries even a vague sense that political majorities ought not be trusted to 
dictate the rights and interests of relatively powerless groups. One need not 
be a radical critic of contemporary hegemonic practices to voice this con-
cern. The idea that such exercises of electoral power cannot be uncritically 
accepted as a product of deliberative democracy is deeply rooted—albeit 
inconsistently acknowledged—in our Republic. Yet notwithstanding Madi-
son’s famous reservations, the celebrated footnote 4, and a half century of 
jurisprudence acknowledging the risks of the tyranny of the majority, con-
cerns that the MCRI and Connerly’s national campaign might constitute 
precisely this phenomenon have been fairly muted across the political spec-
trum. Indeed, the very perception that this trio of anti-affirmative initiatives 
constitutes a mortal wound to affirmative action is premised on the appear-
ance of a fair and legitimate process by which affirmative action has been 
presented, evaluated, and repudiated not only in the court of popular opinion 
but in courts of law as well. Yet, this appearance of cross-institutional settle-
ment on the question of affirmative action is the product of a framing. 
Obscured in the framing of this issue as a principled debate about “prefer-
ences” is the collusion between constitutional, political and cultural forces 
insulating the current distribution of racial power and installing a particular 
social ideology—colorblindness—as the exclusive vision of racial justice in 
American society. This is a vicious circle rather than a parallel press, with 
feedback loops that together constitute a structured pattern of racial inequality.  
The Set-Up  
What enhances the appearance of fairness and cross-institutional settle-
ment is the assumption that the MCRI constitutes an exercise in deliberative 
democracy, a by-the-book, up-or-down vote in which the populace has ren-
dered an informed, considered judgment on the matter. As a judgment from 
a parallel institution to the courts, it adds another arrow to the anti-
affirmative action quiver. Yet the MCRI does not stand apart as a separate 
institutional judgment. The presumption of institutional fairness that at-
taches to the MCRI is itself a product of the judicially authorized ideology 
that these political contests are supposed to affirm or reject.  
At the Court level, affirmative action is set up as a preference by under-
cutting the relevance of the very inequalities that affirmative action is meant 
to correct. The very fact that affirmative action is not required and is thus 
vulnerable to majoritarian politics is a product of a doctrine that acknowl-
edges societal discrimination but labels it too amorphous and “ageless” for 
judicially sanctioned remediation. Yet it is into this very arena of disadvan-
tage and discrimination that the Court delivers affirmative action, permitting 
the majority to kill these policies while retaining preferences that channel 
opportunities to recipients they prefer. This electoral process, animated in 
the Michigan campaign by stereotyping, scape-goating and fraudulent can-
vassing, is dubbed “deliberative” by the mere fact that people have voted. A 
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decision that rests the legitimacy of the MCRI on the mere fact that “the 
people have voted” means that the Court has associated democracy with 
majoritarian decision-making in a context distorted by societal discrimina-
tion, historical segregation, and the sustained competitive advantage of 
whites over nonwhites. This societal disadvantage, represented as “just 
there” is in fact constructed, facilitated and reinforced by the very rules of 
competition between whites and nonwhites that the Court has authorized in 
the struggle for opportunity, resources, representation, and power.  
The Court’s “neutrality,” expressed through its refusal to intervene in a 
decision by the electorate, stands in marked contrast to its interventions 
against political decisions that facilitate affirmative action on behalf of mi-
nority interests. Although the MCRI targets only racial and gender 
“preferences” while leaving a host of genuine preferences fully viable, this 
gerrymandered bit of constitutional lawmaking retains its aura of legitimacy 
because the “preferences” that were eliminated are formally symmetrical—
the ban applies to whites as well as nonwhites, to men as well as women—
even though the effects are functionally asymmetrical. But the choice to 
highlight form over function, to ground equality in formal symmetry rather 
than functional asymmetry, is an ideological component of colorblindness 
itself. It is a contemporary framing choice seriously compromised by its leg-
acy as a descendent of Plessy v. Ferguson, where its focus on segregation’s 
symmetries (both blacks and whites were disabled from sitting in each others 
cars) rather than its asymmetries (segregation symbolized and created second 
class citizenship for Blacks) rendered segregation perfectly constitutional.  
Of course, a different constitutional predicate—a different frame and a 
different set of background rules—would limit the opportunities for majori-
ties to add affirmative action to the long list of decisions undertaken to push 
back against equality demands of racial minorities. A different understand-
ing of where the line should be drawn between “actual” discrimination and 
“societal” discrimination might broaden the responsibility of gatekeepers 
and managers to correct and limit the effects of discrimination manifested 
within their institutions. A fuller appreciation of how race specific public 
policies reach into the future through legal rules insulating current distribu-
tions of wealth and entitlements might help discredit assertions that the 
status quo represents a fair and neutral baseline from which to measure cor-
rective measures. An understanding of intentional discrimination informed 
by cognitive research would broaden the range of discriminatory outcomes 
that could be viewed as correctible by institutional actors seeking to elimi-
nate the effects of discrimination within their own spheres of influence. In 
short, a broader, deeper understanding of discrimination would create a 
broader and deeper predicate for affirmative action.  
Colorblindness 
At the same time that affirmative action has been framed in a manner 
that invites fierce resistance, the campaign to eliminate race and gender con-
scious remedies has been largely underappreciated for the radical 
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intervention that it actually represents. Anti-affirmative action activists 
frame their efforts as a simple plea to return to a fairer time before affirma-
tive action distorted and unfairly denied deserving whites and men an equal 
opportunity. In this light, the MCRI delivers us to that past and releases us 
from an unfortunate and divisive conflict about race and gender preferences. 
Even many of those who would rather maintain affirmative action temporarily 
are sympathetic to the idea that its elimination will bring an end to racial and 
gender jockeying and the divisive politics of resentment. They may have pre-
ferred an end to come later, perhaps on Justice O’Connor’s twenty-five year 
time frame, but eliminating it now is seen to have many positive effects. 
This assumption is a mistake. As Michigan citizens will soon witness, 
there is no simple end to affirmative action discourse because the campaign 
against these policies does not have a simple, straightforward target. Indeed, 
its purpose is not simply a matter of eliminating a set of policies, but in in-
stalling a particular orientation towards inequality itself—one that mandates 
the elimination of race or gender discourses rooted in redistribution. The 
central assumption that animates the anti-preference movement is that all 
identity-conscious policies constitute forms of preferential treatment and 
discrimination. Yet, critics of affirmative action cannot effortlessly achieve 
their goal without pitched and bloody institutional battles because anti-
affirmative propositions such as MCRI cannot on their own mandate gender 
blindness or color blindness. Such initiatives simply require non-
discrimination and the elimination of what is perceived to be preferential 
treatment. To fully realize the elimination of all race or gender conscious 
policies, there would have to be consensus that all identity conscious poli-
cies constitute preferences. As subsequent litigation and contestation over 
affirmative action will reveal, exactly which departures from colorblindness 
or gender-blindness constitute impermissible preferences and which do not 
is in no way subject to categorical definition.  
Installing this ideology across a host of institutions is where the next 
battle lies. The MCRI is not the end game, but simply a beachhead from 
which to ground a dizzying attack on a wide array of politics and practices. 
Even voters who supported Proposal 2 might be surprised at the great 
lengths that organized opposition will take to install this vision. If the ex-
perience of California serves as a true measure, Michiganders will witness 
attacks against an array of programs and policies that stretch even the most 
conventional definitions of what constitutes “preferential treatment.” They 
should not be surprised to find challenges to ethnic and women’s studies pro-
grams, identity-based student organizations, ethnic alumni associations, 
outreach and noticing requirements, and even breast cancer screenings and 
domestic violence shelters as forms of preference. Not all of these efforts will 
be successful, but they clearly confirm that there is a broader agenda at play.  
Where the proponents of anti-affirmative action initiatives are likely to 
achieve effortless victories is in institutions that have heretofore failed to 
subject their everyday practices and organizational values to any meaningful 
equity analysis. The consequences of this failure may well generate a sur-
prising split among various segments of affirmative action’s supporters. 
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Predictably, some members of this constituency—most likely the beneficiar-
ies themselves—will assume that the successful history of using differential 
criteria to select, educate and produce generations of highly successful and 
accomplished minority professionals will forever foreclose a hasty retreat to 
criteria that will reproduce racial disparities that rival the 1960s. If gate-
keepers were thought to have learned anything from the several decades in 
which affirmative action was practiced, one might certainly presume that at 
least one lesson would point to the intolerable unfairness of sustaining what 
has been revealed to be artificial barriers to exclude generations of minori-
ties who are virtually identical in promise to those alums who are feted and 
celebrated by their respective institutions. Those who resist a return to the 
exclusive use of undifferentiated criteria might be buoyed in their hopes that 
the high level studies that confirm the success of affirmative admissions 
policies would reinforce their arguments that differential criteria are not 
preferences at all, and that if anything violates the MCRI, it would be the 
unjustified return to exclusionary criteria. Not only preferences are barred 
by MCRI, but discrimination as well. But the assumption that affirmative 
action supporters would stand shoulder to shoulder to collectively interro-
gate their institution’s exclusionary practices will lead to profound 
disappointment for those who hope for a united front. What will be revealed 
is that for many traditional supporters of affirmative action, this commit-
ment does not constitute an indictment of the standard criteria, nor does it 
reveal an awareness of the racial parameters of exclusion that affirmative 
action was intended to neutralize. Unfortunately, since affirmative action 
policies have been seen as special measures to lift up the marginally quali-
fied, many supporters will snap back to the traditional criteria so fast that 
heads will spin. Worst still will be those who will “overinterpret” the MCRI, 
believing that the very act of noticing much less commenting on the racial 
hemorrhaging that will take place runs afoul of the MCRI. 
In these moments, proponents of MCRI will be gleefully close to being 
handed their ultimate goal, one wished for but not mandated by the MCRI. 
What will emerge is a recognition that what is really at stake here is more 
than eliminating so-called “reverse discrimination.” These battles will reveal 
that the agenda here is to erase our very ability to articulate any legitimate 
rationale for recognizing—must less neutralizing—the profound asymme-
tries in opportunity and access that exist throughout American society. What 
the proponents of the ideology of colorblindness seek is far more than some 
ideal of equality. Theirs is a much more radical agenda designed to resolve 
the problem of inequality by essentially removing it from political and legal 
discourse altogether. 
Competing Backstories 
At the end of the day, whether the advocates for MCRI, and other initia-
tives like it, can successfully extend their campaign deep into our political 
culture turns on the relative strength of their backstory in comparison to the 
counter-narrative offered by those who defend affirmative action. The MCRI 
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back story paints a clear portrait, although it represents a societal fantasy. Its 
language invites voters to cast a vote for a return to the past. It is hard to see 
how an explicit invitation to return to an American past can possibly func-
tion as an endorsement of colorblindness, but the past that the MCRI invites 
Americans to join is a mythical past wherein equal treatment and non-
discrimination ruled the day. It is a past where people were given a fair 
shake based not on who they were, but on their merit. Affirmative action is 
said to have disrupted this past to create the proportional representation of 
underrepresented minorities in a broad range of American institutions. In 
this sense, equality of opportunity is said to have been replaced by equality 
of results. And, the language of the Civil Rights Movement appears to add 
moral authority to this fantasy.  
This back story, obviously fabricated and thin on reality, nonetheless 
finds amplification in the opinions of more influential and legitimate sources 
such as the Supreme Court. In each of its major affirmative action cases, the 
racial past has been pictured as a distant reality disconnected from the pre-
sent. From this perspective, antidiscrimination law appears as a portal 
through which contemporary Americans stepped through to a brand new 
present, a world free of the structural iniquities forged during the era of 
American apartheid. Indeed, the present is so attenuated from that past that 
we have to speculate whether the social realities in which we now live bear 
anything but the most coincidental relation to our nations recent past. The 
popular fiction of a past where equality reins supreme, a past divorced from 
social reality, serves to reframe contemporary forms of racial inequality as 
somewhat of a sociological puzzle, largely the result of cultural and personal 
choices that should not be artificially interfered with or socially engineered 
out of existence.  
These descriptive world views ground the claim that colorblindness 
symbolizes nothing more than a return to an era of principled equality 
wherein one pays little or no attention to a person’s racial identity. Yet this 
colorblind ideal is fueled by racial stereotypes and group-based explanations 
for the marginalization of certain racial minorities, justifications that contra-
dict the idea that this perspective transcends a color conscious prism. To the 
contrary, colorblind advocates rely on logics of racial difference to natural-
ize and legitimize the very inequalities that affirmative action seeks to 
remedy. Consider Ward Connerly’s response to the fact that out of more than 
4,200 freshmen currently enrolled at UCLA, only about 100 are African 
American. His assertion that black freshmen would do better if they stopped 
listening to rap music and focused on the books is the quintessential illustra-
tion of the color-conscious politics of the so-called colorblind constituency.  
The Public Debate 
The public debate on affirmative action receives and amplifies the oppo-
nents’ backstory both in terms of what it chooses to highlight and what it 
systematically chooses to ignore. The growing sense that race discrimination 
and inequality is passé and largely irrelevant is amplified, if not actually 
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produced, in the media’s failure to actively report on the reasons why af-
firmative action is necessary. A study by the media watchdog Fairness and 
Accuracy in Reporting drives this point home. FAIR researched the cover-
age of affirmative action in major newspapers over a six month period and 
found that in over 80% of the stories affirmative action was not linked in 
any way to processes of discrimination or inequality. Affirmative action in 
these stories is wholly disconnected from any sense of fairness, and unre-
lated obstacles and disadvantages that might be faced by its beneficiaries. 
Readers are thus invited to view the dearth of minorities that would other-
wise prevail in the absence of affirmative action as simply the product of 
their own making. Without saying so, affirmative action is thus easily pre-
sented at best as an act of noblesse oblige, and at worst as unfair act of 
social engineering.  
Equally telling was the fact that the vast majority of stories failed to 
mention either white women or other people of color as beneficiaries of af-
firmative action. Most of the very few that did mention white women or 
other racial groups soon abandoned even this momentary recognition to fo-
cus exclusively on African Americans as the focus of the controversy. The 
role of African Americans as the sole representative of affirmative action 
was starkly symbolized by a cover illustration on the Newsweek issue pro-
viding coverage on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. Appearing 
under the title, Affirmative Action: Do We Still Need It? 10 Ways to Think 
about it Now was a picture of a young African American man, dressed in 
preppy khakis, shirt, and tie. Wearing spectacles and sporting a book, the 
figure cut a confident pose reflecting apparent class advantage and perhaps 
even racial entitlement. Unknown to the casual observer, the image itself 
was utterly staged—the young man was not a University of Michigan stu-
dent but a model. Credits on the inside cover provide appropriate 
acknowledgements to the various vendors that supplied the tie, the specs and 
the clothes.  
For Newsweek, this illustration represented the quintessential image of 
the affirmative action beneficiary as a means to suggest at least three ways 
of thinking about whether affirmative action was still necessary: the pro-
grams were about race, not about gender, they were about African 
Americans, not about other people of color, and they were about extending 
advantages to elite Blacks, rather than impoverished African Americans. 
Thus, the graphic powerfully amplified the distorted discourse around af-
firmative action, one that suggests that these policies represent a set of 
entitlement programs for middle class and potentially undeserving African 
Americans. Of course nothing could be further from the truth. This is simply 
a gross distortion of reality, especially given that the primary beneficiaries 
of affirmative action have been Euro-American women.  
This stereotypical image captures in multiple ways the distorted framing 
of affirmative action that advocates must learn to meet more effectively. 
Recognizing that anti-Black stereotypes constitute readily deployable capi-
tal against affirmative action presents a delicate Catch 22 for proponents. 
They must meet the stereotypes squarely while at the same time broadening 
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the image of the beneficiary class to reveal the multitude of non-African 
Americans who have benefited from these programs and who also stand to 
lose should they be eliminated. Yet the call to perform this delicate maneu-
ver in Michigan gave way to a rather blunt and ultimately ineffective 
strategy of highlighting women and girls as the principle beneficiaries of 
affirmative action.  
Replicating the strategy used in Washington, the campaign to defeat 
MCRI featured images, testimonials and radio spots that focused on affirma-
tive action’s benefits to women. In this sense, the campaign sought to 
reframe affirmative action as something other than a black entitlement pro-
gram. Instead, it was presented as a friendlier, familiar, and family-centric 
set of programs that benefited working families. Supporters of affirmative 
action also sought an upbeat chord, amplifying the trend away from the 
negative imagery associated with racial discrimination toward a positive 
message of opportunity and shared destiny across racial group differences. 
Media gurus, pollsters, and opinion researchers seemed to advise that con-
tested social justice issues might be better positioned in the public mind if 
they were reframed in a manner that avoided the “divisiveness” of racial 
discourse.  
But, there are serious limitations to this strategy, and the outcomes in 
California, Washington and Michigan indicate that this approach is not a 
recipe for success. The strategy hardly seemed effective in persuading white 
women—only 43% of them voted against Proposal 2 in Michigan while 
57% voted for its passage. In the ten years since the adoption of Prop. 209 in 
California, there has been virtually no movement in persuading white 
women to vote in favor of affirmative action. Moreover, this way of framing 
the debate managed to capture only 42% of the overall vote. The only good 
news is that greater percentages of people of color voted against the pro-
posal in Michigan than in California, an even more impressive fact given 
that many minority organizers complained that anti-MCRI messaging was 
not targeted to their communities.  
It is probably true, of course, that so-called “persuadable” audiences ini-
tially responded positively to affirmative action when these messages are 
grounded in their understanding of barriers to women’s advancement. How-
ever, this receptivity does not appear to be sustainable during the long road 
to the ballot box. It is possible that this strategy proved ineffective because it 
failed to contest the racially tinted frames that Americans already have about 
this issue. Foregrounding (white) women in the frame does little to erase the 
omnipresent racial subject that serves as a lightning rod for most of the 
stereotypes associated with affirmative action. Blacks are still at the center 
of the picture, and voters who show some receptivity to the gender analysis 
still must be inoculated in some way against the stereotypes and race-baiting 
that pervades this debate. Opponents of affirmative action managed to sim-
ply roll the campaign’s highlighting of women into their unchanged view 
that the debate was really about Black people. Said one Michigan woman of 
her white friends, “A lot of them see right through this campaign strategy. 
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They say that it is obvious that ‘the Blacks’ are getting the white women to 
carry their water for them.” 
Track Metaphor 
If affirmative action is to be rescued, the distorted conceptual box which 
it has been forced to occupy in law, politics and culture must be revealed, 
contested and discarded. Affirmative action is at a crossroads and may in-
deed cease to exist as we know it. But ending affirmative action as we know 
can, in fact, be an opportunity to know affirmative action in a different way. 
Indeed, what most people think they know about affirmative isn’t right, and 
what is right about affirmative action most people don’t know.  
The contest now is to reframe and reground these vitally important op-
portunity policies in all spheres of American society. The campaign to 
defend affirmative action has to be a campaign to reframe the terms of the 
debate. Not only must new images, new messages and new strategies be 
deployed to squarely meet the pre-existing misconceptions about the pro-
grams themselves, the mystifying role of law in naturalizing and insulating 
the status quo must also be radically rethought. Central to both these efforts 
is the steady development of persuadable backstories and telling metaphors 
to wrest away from supporters as well as opponents their critical investment 
in the naturalness of the status quo. Nothing is more important to this mis-
sion than challenging the idea of preference.  
One project undertaken by the AAPF seeks to advance this reframing by 
synthesizing existing knowledge from a variety of disciplines and sources 
and delivering these ideas in a way that represents the issues in a more com-
pelling framework. As an example of this reframing project, consider one of 
the most common metaphors used to capture the competing interests at 
stake in affirmative action, the image of the equal opportunity race. In an 
ideal race all runners start at the same point and the rightful rewards go to 
the best runners. But affirmative action is said to place some runners a half 
length or more ahead of non-preferred runners. In this context, both oppo-
nents and defenders of affirmative action tend to agree that this placement 
represents a preference for those who are placed ahead in the staggered 
start. They disagree, however, about whether such preferences are justified. 
For opponents, the head start is unfair, inefficient, divisive and counterpro-
ductive. In their view, the beneficiaries of affirmative action are tainted 
because they are given an unfair advantage. No matter how well they’ve run 
the race, their accomplishments cannot be credited or trusted. In this sce-
nario, the non-preferred runners have every reason to be resentful because 
they have been forced to run in a rigged race and have likely lost their right-
ful place in the winner’s box.  
The defenders of affirmative action worry about the resentment and 
other costs associated with sustaining such exceptions to the fair race, but 
they argue that the benefits of a diverse set of winners offsets these costs. 
While the two sides differ in their normative assessment of whether the head 
start is defensible or not, what they share is actually more telling: both tend 
CRENSHAW FINAL.DOC 2/2/2007 11:00 PM 
132 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 105:123 
 
to see the problem of affirmative action in terms of damaged runners unable 
to compete on their own. As long as affirmative action is framed in terms of 
damaged runners, there is little wonder that opposition to it will continue to 
be intense, and that support for it, even among some of its beneficiaries, will 
often be lukewarm.  
But, there is an alternative back story that can be told, one that actually 
throws light on the conditions that affirmative action is designed to address. 
This alternative frame suggests that the problem affirmative action seeks to 
address is not damaged runners, but damaged lanes that make the race more 
difficult for some competitors to run than others. Rethinking affirmative 
action so as to account for the unequal conditions of the lanes on the track—
the debris that runners must avoid, the craters over which they must climb, 
the crevices that they must jump and the detours that they must maneuver—
suggests that affirmative action is not about providing preferences at all. 
Rather it is about removing and neutralizing the obstacles and conditions 
that compromise the fair running of the race. Structural inequality, exclu-
sionary institutional practices, trans-generational disadvantages and even 
unconscious biases are just a few of the conditions that crowd the lanes of 
would-be recipients of affirmative programs. These conditions are neither 
mysterious nor unverifiable. In fact, they can be empirically demonstrated 
with relative ease, as research from a variety of fields reveals. To attend to 
the elimination of such circumstances is hardly to promote reverse discrimi-
nation. It reflects only a matter of simple justice. 
Thus, for affirmative action to be productively reframed, the pervasive 
and troubling disconnect between what is knowable about contemporary 
inequality has to be brought into mainstream discourse on affirmative ac-
tion. 
Conclusion 
Affirmative action discourse can be strengthened by reconnecting it to 
its equality-based moorings, by building an effective counter-narrative to the 
prevailing backstories that so utterly distort the causes and consequences of 
racial inequality today. Most fundamentally, affirmative action needs to be 
rescued from the distortions produced by colorblindness, which must be 
exposed and deposed. As demonstrated above, colorblindness manages to do 
its work without the opposition it might otherwise warrant by masquerading 
as the heir apparent to the very movement that it seeks to contain and desta-
bilize.  
This strategy is all the more remarkable given the breathtakingly bold 
act of cooptation that this re-deployment of colorblindness represents. Con-
ceived in the pitched battle against white supremacy, colorblind rhetoric has 
been ripped from the grasp of the movements’ martyrs and reared to repudi-
ate its liberationist legacy. Far from serving as a beacon of hope, a new 
baseline representing what American could have been in the absence of 
deeply entrenched patterns of white supremacy, colorblindness now delivers 
its reputation and historical capital to a specious claim that the journey to 
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the promised land is nearly complete. In so doing, it helps turn the page 
away from the wrenching human drama of a desperate group struggle 
against a soul-destroying, virtually unshakable system of white supremacy 
to a fairy tale confection of poppy fields and wishful thinking. In this sense, 
it now delivers us to the new day by its hypnotic command to close our eyes 
and click our heels, whispering the glorious mantra “there’s no place like 
America.”  
For many, this romp through the poppy-fields of denial provides a relief 
from the gnawing sense that something has been left behind, a faint recol-
lection that there really is something terribly wrong with our social 
structure. In this instant of distraction, a face-off between colorblindness 
and affirmative action occurred that few seem to notice. In that flicker of 
time, affirmative action was vacuumed out of its modest role as a facilitator 
of change, a corrector, a remover of obstacles, and it is now installed as the 
quintessential embodiment of the posse of problems that it was designed to 
vanquish—discrimination, racial supremacy, segregation, and racial stereo-
typing. While affirmative action struggles to escape these false associations, 
colorblindness is now poised to assume the throne of racial justice in 
American society. Should it succeed, the whole family of ideas bound up 
with affirmative action—the imperative of addressing institutional discrimi-
nation, the value of diversity, the relevance of disparate impact, the simple 
justice of Brown v. Board of Education, will be banished from legitimate 
discourse.  
At the end of the day, this is really what is at stake in these contests over 
affirmative action. If intellectual, legal and political resources are not de-
ployed to arrest this development, the ever broadening category of 
“preference” will eventually grow to include every race sensitive policy in-
cluding the conscious objective of achieving a fully diverse and integrated 
society. 
